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FINDER VS. LOCUS IN QUO-AN OUTLINE
By JOHN C. PAULUS*
Introduction
Although the subject matter of a course exclusively devoted to personal
property is not normally considered complex, there is at least one area in
that field which has given teachers and writers, as well as practicing attor-
neys, much difficulty This area involves the law of lost property, and more
specifically the relative rights of finders and owners of the land when goods
are found by one person on another's land.' The difficulty referred to is
not caused by the profoundness of the problem or the complexity of the
fact situations involved, but seems to be attributable to the inability of the
courts to satisfy themselves as to the most satisfactory course to follow in
order to obtain a result which will best serve social needs.
Policy considerations favoring the finder of lost goods relate to the
desire to encourage finding, while on the other hand, it is also considered
good public policy to favor the owner of the land since his possession of the
lost article increases the possibility of its return to the loser. These con-
flicting policy factors often cause the courts to tread a crooked path when
considering the rights of a finder as against the owner of the locus in quo 2
For what it is worth, the following summary or outline of the law re-
garding the relative rights of finders as against the owners of the locus in
quo is submitted.
(1) The owner of the locus in quo prevails over the finder if the latter was
a servant of such owner and had the duty to turn over found goods to
him.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the finder prevails if the goods
were abandoned.
(3) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the owner of the locus in quo
prevails if he was in a fiduciary relationship with the probable loser at
the time the goods were lost or misplaced.
(4) Except as provided in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3), the finder pre-
vails if the goods were lost, and the owner of the locus in quo prevails
if the goods were mislaid.
The balance of this article is devoted to an attempt to justify each para-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Willamette University, Salem, Oregon, B.A., J.D., State
University of Iowa City, Iowa.
I For a general discussion of this problem see Aigler, Rights of Finders, 21 MICH[. L. REv.
664 (1923), Moreland, The Rights of Finders of Lost Property, 16 Ky. L." 3 (1927), Morton,
Public Policy and the Finder Cases, 1 Wyo. L.J. 101 (1947) , see also Notes, 8 FORD. L. REV. 222
(1939) and 21 MINN. L. REV. 191 (1936).
2 E.g., compare Danielson v Roberts, 44 Or. 108, 74 Pac. 913, 65 L.R.A. 526 (1904) wiith
Ferguson v Ray, 44 Or. 557, 77 Pac. 600 (1904).
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graph of this outline in the order of its appearance, and an attempt to jus-
tify the omission from the outline of certain factors which seemingly, at
least, have had great effect in finder vs. owner of locus in quo litigations.
Master-Servant Relationship
Although there is a paucity of authority supporting paragraph (1) of
the outline, there can be little doubt but that the courts will recognize and
enforce a duty created by contract, even though public policy might dic-
tate that the finder be preferred. In those cases dealing with servants in
which the owner of the locus prevailed, there were usually additional
reasons for preferring the owner over and above the master-servant rela-
tionship.3 Probably the recent case of Jackson v. Steinberg4 supports para-
graph (1) of the outline as strongly as any, and in this case the court relied
heavily upon the fact that the goods were mislaid and that there was a fidu-
ciary relationship between the probable loser and the owner of the locus.5
Although it has been suggested that the duty to turn over found goods
may be readily implied from the nature of the employment, 6 the courts are
very reluctant to imply the duty and in many instances have favored the
finder even when such implication would appear to be appropriate. For
instance, in cases in which the servant is hired to clean up the premises and
finds goods during the cleaning operation, the courts have favored the ser-
vant,7 as well as in situations where the servant has a position of respon-
3 E.g., State v. Buzard, 235 Mo.App. 636, 144 S.W.2d 847 (1940) (owner-master preferred
but goods found were considered mislaid), Heddle v. Bank of Hamilton, 17 B.C. 306 (1912)
(mislaid goods found by servant and master given preference). Cf. Noble v. City of Palo Alto,
89 Cal.App. 47, 264 Pac. 529 (1928), in which a policeman was unable to prevail as against
the city (his employer) m a litigation involving bicycles that he had found while on duty. In
South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, 2 Q.B.D. 44 (1896), a leading English case, the
master. prevailed when his servant was cleaning out a pool and found two rings; however, the
English court did not consider the effect of the master-servant relationship upon the rights
of the parties and hinged the decision entirely upon the proposition that an owner possesses
everything attached to or under his land. In Flax v. Monticello Realty Co., 185 Va. 474, 39
S.E.2d 308 (1946) the master was preferred over a third party claimant.
4 186 Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376, 205 P.2d 562 (1948), 3 VAND. L. Rxv. 661, (1950).
5 The court said in the Jackson case, supra note 4, that, "The decisive feature of the present
case is the fact that plaintiff was an employee or servant of the owner or occupant of the
premises, and that, m discovering the bills and turning them over to her employer, she was
simply performing the duties of her employment. She was allowed to enter the guest room
solely in order to do her work as chambermaid, and she was expressly instructed to take to
the desk clerk any mislaid or forgotten property which she nght discover."
6 Augler, Rights of Finders, 21 MIcH. L. REv. 664, 681 (ftn) (1923), Note, 60 ALB. L.J. 346
(1899).
7 Robertson v. Ellis, 58 Or. 219, 114 Pac. 100 (1911)- (servant found gold coins while
cleang -vt a warehouse), Damelson v. Roberts, 44 Or. 108, 74 Pac. 913, 65 L.R.A. 526 (1904)
(servants found gold coins while cleaning out a chicken house), Hamaker v. Blanchard. 90 Pa.
377 (1S79) (domestic servant found money in public parlor of hotel).
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sibility and the duty might easily be inferred.' Therefore, in order to fall
within paragraph (1) of the outline it appears that the owner of the locus
zn quo will probably be required to show that turning over found goods was
an express duty of the servant.'
Abandoned Property- Treasure Trove
The outline provides that the finder is preferred when the property is
abandoned unless he is bound by contract to turn all goods over to the
owner of the locus in quo. The reason for the exception, as explained
above,1" is based upon the recognition of contractual obligations. The rule
expressed in paragraph (2) of the outline is based upon the theory that the
finder should prevail whenever possible in order to encourage finding and
there is no reason for denying such preference in the abandoned property
cases. Since the loser is no longer interested in the property, the reason for
favoring the owner of the locus has been eliminated.
Property is considered abandoned when it is evident that all former
owners have severed all relationship with it. Whether or not property is
abandoned is a question of intent on the part of the former owner, and in
determining such a question the courts look at the nature of the article and
its location and conditions when found to determine whether or not the
former owner has manifested an intent to divest himself of all of his inter-
ests in the chattel."
In their desire to prefer the finder in cases where the goods are mis-
laid, 2 or where for some other reason the owner of the locus would other-
wise prevail, the courts have found that the goods were abandoned under
circumstances where the intent to abandon on the part of the former owner
is doubtful.'8 A recent case illustrating this fact is Erickson v. Sinykrn.'4
8 Enckson v. Sinykin, 223 Minn. 232, 26 NAV.2d 172, 170 A.L.R. 697 (1947) (redeco-
rators found money under a rug m a hotel room they were redecorating), Toledo Trust Co.
v. Simmons, 52 Ohio App. 373, 3 N.E.2d 661 (1935) (servant found money while operating an
electric door in a bank), Tatum v. Sharpless, 6 Phila. 18 (1865) (conductor found pocket book
on passenger car seat). In Bowen v. Sullivan, 62 Ind. 281 (1878), the finder was permitted
to keep money found in waste paper in a paper mill, however, the finder was employed in the
mill as a rag resorter rather than as a waste paper worker.
9 In Damelson v. Roberts, 44 Or. 108, 108 Pac. 913, 65 L.R.A. 526 (1904), the court said:
"The fact that the money was found on the prenuses of the defendants, or that the plaintiffs
were in their service at the time, can m no way affect the plaintiffs' right to possession, or their
duty in reference to the lost treasure."
1 0 Supra p. 181.
1 1 See e.g., Erickson v. Sinykm, 223 Minn. 232, 26 N.W.2d 172, 170 A.L.R. 697 (1947),
Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376, 205 P.2d 562 (1948).
12 For a discussion of lost vs. mislaid see p. 190 infra.
13 See treasure trove cases, note 19 znfra.
14223 Minn. 232, 26 N.W.2d 172, 170 A.L.R. 697 (1947), 33 Iowa. L. REv. 155 (1947),
46 MINN. L. Rlv. 266 (1947), 32 MINN. L. Rav. 192 (1948), 4 WAsH. AND LEE L. REV. 214
(1947).
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In this case $760 in paper currency was found by redecorators underneath
a rug in a hotel room. The money was quite obviously mislaid rather than
lost, and with that factor present courts would normally favor the owner
of the locus. The Minnesota court found that the money was abandoned
and permitted the finder to prevail notwithstanding the fact that the money
had probably been placed under the rug a relatively short time before its
recovery, and its nature would normally raise a presumption against aban-
donment.15 The court was influenced by the fact that there was some ques-
tion concerning the good faith of the owner of the hotel, and the fact that
the money found had been called in for redemption by the federal gov-
ernment.
In order to further discuss the problem of abandonment it is advisable
to consider the treasure trove cases since in most situations in which goods
have been found to have been abandoned, treasure trove was involved."
Treasure trove was not included in the outline because of the confusion
surrounding the question of what constitutes treasure trove and what law
applies to it. Treasure trove has been defined as "money or coin found hid-
den or secreted in the earth or other private place; the owner being un-
known."'17 This definition is unfortunate in that it does not include the ele-
ment of abandonment which is usually present in the cases in which the
court finds that treasure trove is involved.' In those situations where the
treasure was discovered under circumstaaces which indicated that it had
been buried for a long period of time and the owner has given up all claim
to it, the courts have considered the goods as treasure trove within the legal
sense. On the other hand, the courts have refused to consider goods as
1 5 The court distinguished the principal case from Flax v. Monticello Realty Co., 185 Va.
474, 39 S.E.2d 308 (1946), on the basis of the master-servant relationship and the difference
in the duties of the servant. The servant in the Flax case was a chambermaid.
16 For a discussion of treasure trove see Dobie, The Law of Treasure Trove, 43 Juran. REv.
300 (1931), Emden, The Law of Treasure Trove, Past and Present, 42 LAW Q. REv. 368 (1926),
see also Notes, 23 GEo. L.J. 559 (1935), 22 Tnmal L. REv. 326 (1949) and 23 TuAiNm L. Rev.
409 (1949).
17 Damelson v. Roberts, 44 Or. 108, 74 Pac. 913, 65 L.RA. 526 (1904), Robertson v. Ellis,
58 Or. 219, 114 Pac. 100 (1911). A more elaborate definition has been used by American courts,
and it also ends with the statement, "the owner being unknown"; see Groover v. Tippins,
51 Ga.App. 47, 179 S.E. 634 (1935) and Weeks v. Hackett, 104 Me. 264, 71 Ati. 858 (1908).
1 8 .g., in Danielson v. Roberts, 44 Or. 108, 74 Pac. 913, 65 L.RA. 526.(1904), the court
said: "The circumstances under which it was discovered, the condition of the vessel in which
it was contained, and the place of deposit, as shown by the plaintiffs' testimony, all tend with
more or less force to indicate that it had been buried for some considerable time, and that the
owner was probably dead or unknown."
29 In Groover v. Tippms, 51 GaApp. 47, 179 S.E. 634 (1935), gold dust and gold bullion
was dug out of the ground. In Zornes v. Bowen, 223 Ia. 1141, 274 N.W 877 (1937), money
was found in jars wrapped in cloth, the cloth had been there so long that it disintegrated when,
Feb., 1955]
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a treasure trove when the abandonment factor is missing, even though the
definition that is used does not include the element of abandonment.2 In
fact, in recent cases the courts have failed to go into the question of treas-
ure trove when treasure was concealed, but merely considered the question
of abandonment.2
Over and above the fact that the definition of treasure trove leaves one
in doubt as to when treasure trove is involved (that is, what types of goods
are included within the definition,2" and whether or not the element of
abandonment is required), the statements made concerning the law relat-
ing to treasure trove appear to be unfortunate and confusing. For instance,
it is said that "in this country the law relating to treasure trove has gen-
exposed to air. In Weeks v. Hackett, 104 Me. 264, 71 Atl. 858 (1908), coins were found buried
in the ground. In Danielson v. Roberts, 44 Or. 108, 74 Pac. 913, 65 L.R.A. 526 (1904), coins
were found by children whle cleaning out a chicken house; the dirt over the buried coins had
been undisturbed for a long time and the sacks which contained the coins were musty and par-
tially decayed. In Robertson v. Ellis, 58 Or. 219, 114 Pac. 100 (1911), the court said: "There
is testimony in this case that the comb cases in which the money was found were mouldy and
covered with dust, indicating that the money had been placed where found within no very
recent period. We cannot say as a matter of law how ancient the deposit must be in order to
include it within the rule of Danielson v. Roberts, or how recent it must be to take it out of
the operation of that decision." See also Zech v Accola, 253 Wis. 80, 33 N.W.2d 232 (1948),
in which money roiled up in rags was considered treasure trove and therefore excluded from
statutes relating to lost property
20 In Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376, 205 P.2d 562 (1948), the court said:
"The treasure must have been hidden or concealed so long as to indicate that its owner, in all
probability, is dead or unknown The recentness of the deposit justifies the inference that,
at the time of the finding, the owner probably was still alive and would be discovered. These
considerations further confirm our opinion that the bills were not treasure trove."
In Ferguson v. Ray, 44 Or. 557, 77 Pac. 600 (1904), the court found that gold-beanng
quartz was not treasure trove, relymg in part upon the argument that it was not the type of
goods included in the definition.
21 In Erickson v. Sinykin, 223 Minn. 232, 26 N.W.2d 172, 170 A.L.R. 697 (1947), the
court found that money had been abandoned and in Flax v. Monticello Realty Co., 185 Va. 474,
39 S.E.2d 308 (1946), the court held that a diamond brooch was not abandoned and ruled for
the owner of the locus.
22 In their comments on what may be the subject matter of treasure trove the court in
Ferguson v Ray, 44 Or. 557, 77 Pac. 600 (1904) said: "Bouvier gives the same definition,
except that he adds that it includes not only gold and silver, but whatever may constitute riches,
as vases, urns, statutes, etc. BOUVIER, DICTIONARY. Mr. Chief Justice Appleton declares that
'ncthing is treasure trove except gold and silver.' Livermore v. White, 74 Me. 452, 456, 43 Am
Rep. 600. So, according to an article found in the LAw TIMES (vol. 81, p.21), the prerogative
of treasure trove is strictly limited, and touches only gold and silver plate and bullion, discard-
ing the baser metals; and in Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co., 33 Law Rep. (Ch. Div.) 562, it is said
that Roman coins, not being gold or silver coins, did not fall within the royal prerogative of
treasure trove. A case has come to our notice where it seems to have been conceded that certain
cups, a chalice, pyxes, and a paten, all of silver, were treasure trove (Attorney General v. Moore,
Law Rep. (I Ch. Div.) 676), and another where solid gold rings and ornaments were so classed
(Queen v Thomas, 33 Law Jour. (N.S.) p.22)."
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erally been merged into the law of tha finder of lost property "I This
statement is misleading since there is a distinction, made between lost and
mislaid property,' and, if anything, treasure trove resembles mislaid prop-
erty and should be considered as such. What is meant, of course, is that
treasure trove does not have to be considered separately and its presence
or absence in a given case is not important since the normal rules relating
to finders will govern; hence, discovered treasure will be considered mis-
laid and be given to the owner of the locus unless it has been abandoned
by former owners.'
From the above discussion it can be seen that a person would be ill-
advised to attempt to incorporate treasure trove as such into an outline of
the rights of finders as against the owner of the locus in quo. It is better to
assume that goods which might fall within that category are to be treated
the same as other goods, and permit the finder to prevail if, and only if,
such goods are abandoned, and if the finder is not bound by an employment
contract to turn all goods he finds over to the owner of the locus in quo2 6
Fiduciary Relationship -Private vs. Public Locus
In order for the law of finders to conform with normal concepts of pos-
session and rights of possession; in all cases (except in certain cases in-
volving the master-servant relationship) where the owner of the locus in
quo is given preference over the finder, it is necessary to find prior posses-
sion in the locus owner. Possession, of course, requires a physical and mental
relationship to the thing possessed, and in the case of real property it is
often difficult to be convinced that the owner of the realty does have the
necessary relationship to chattels that are on his land without his knowl-
edge. It is particularly difficult to find an "intent to control" under such
circumstances.
South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharmans is a leading English case
which gave great weight to the following statement from Pollock and
2 3 Danielson v. Roberts, 44 Or. 108, 74 Pac. 913, 65 L.R.A. 526 (1904).
2 4 See p. 190 infra.2 5 However, the courts have retained the distinction between treasure trove and lost prop-
erty when dealing with statutes. See Sovern v. Yoran, 16 Or. 269, 20 Pac. 100 (1888), and
Zech v. Accola, 253 Wis. 80, 33 N.W.2d 232 (1948).
2 6 The possibility of abandoned goods becoming part of the realty is considered at p. 193
infra.
27Discussons on possession may be found m H Olmrs, ComaeoN LAw, 206-246 (1881),
PorLocK AND WRIGHT, ESSAY ON PossEssIoN in THE CoarON LAW (1888), SALPEoND, Jusys-
PRUDENcz (7th ed.), 293-328 (1924), BROWN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY, pp. 18 to 21 (1936) ;
Binghamr, The Nature and Importance of Legal Possession, 13 Mxsrr. L. REv. 535 (1925),
Francis, Three Cases on Possession-Some Further Observations, 14 ST. Louis L. REv. 11
(1928), Shartel, Meaning of Possession, 16 MmNN. L. RPv. 611 (1932).
28 2 Q.B.D. 44 (1896).
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Wright's treatise on possession:' "The possession of land carries with it
in general, by our law, possession of everything which is attacked to or
under that land, and, in the absence of a better title elsewhere, the right to
possess it also." 3 (Italics added.)
The English court in the Sharman case placed great stress upon the
words "attached to or under" since they had before them a case involving
rings found embedded in a swimmng pool, and they were distinguishing
these facts from the case of Bridges v Hawkesworth3' in which a parcel
was found in the public part of a shop. It was held that the owner of the
realty possessed the rings in the swimming pool and, therefore, prevailed
as against the finder, while in the Bridges case the court had favored the
finder. The Sharman and Bridges cases establish the English rule that the
important decision to be made is whether or not the prermses upon which
the property was found were open to the public or were private.
In the recent case of Hannah v Peel32 it is obvious that the English
court is not concerned with the distinction between lost and mislaid goods
and places the emphasis on the public or private nature of the locus. How-
ever, they choose to follow the Bridges case and favor the finder when the
goods were found in a home being used as a soldier's barracks, which would
appear to be a far cry from a place open to the public. In addition, the court
indicates that the Sharman case should be limited to the "attached to or
under" provision when it says. "It would appear to be the law from the
authorities I have cited, and particularly from Bridges v Hawkesworth,
that a man does not necessarily possess a thing which is lying unattached
on the surface of his land even though the thng is not possessed by some-
one else."1
33
In view of the Hannah case, it would appear that the English authority
considers the owner of the locus in possession of the chattel (and prefers
the owner of the locus over the finder) only in those cases where the goods
are attached to or under the land, and does not favor such owner where
the chattel is discovered on that part of the locus from which the public is
excluded.3
2 9 
ESSAY ON POSSESSION IN T=E COMMON LAW, p.41.
3o The statement continues, "And it makes no difference that the possessor is not aware
of the thing's existence But it seems preferable to say that the legal possession rests on a
real de facto possession constituted by the occupier's general power and intent to exclude un-
authorized interference."
31 21 L.J.Q.B. 75 (1851).
32 K.B.D. 509 (1945), Note, 46 Mc. L. REv. 235 (1947).
8 3 Ibzd at 520.
34For comments on the English cases see Notes, 79 IR.L.T. 305 (1945), 61 Scor. L. REV.
177 (1945), 78 SoL.J. 745 (1934), 35 N.J.L.J. 362 (1912) and 75 L.J. 93 (1933).
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The American courts have never given the great weight to the public
or private nature of the locus in quo as the English courts have, although
such factor may have some influence in determining whether goods are
lost or mislaid.35 However, in this country the courts have generally con-
cluded that under certain circumstances the owner of the locus rn quo has
prior possession based upon the privacy of the place where the chattel is
discovered. 6 The owner of the locus is considered a gratuitous bailee of
the found goods if it is believed that he was in a fiduciary relationship with
the probable loser, and was under an obligation to assume control over the
chattel.
Cases falling into two groups furnish the authority for paragraph (3)
of the outline. One line of cases deals with the customer and bank relation-
ship, and the other with the relationship that exists between a hotel and its
guest. In both groups it is required that the unclaimed goods be located in
that part of the locus in quo which is not open to the general public."
The leading case supporting the proposition that a bank owes a fidu-
ciary duty to its customers to take custody of all goods lost by customers
in the private parts of the bank is Silcott v. Louisville Trust Co.33 In this
case the goods were found on the floor in the safety deposit department of
the bank. Since the goods were clearly lost rather than mislaid, the finder
would normally prevail unless it was found that for some reason the owner
of the locus had prior possession of the chattels. In referring to pleadings
which indicated the extreme privacy of the safety deposit vault the court
said: "From the allegations of the answer, therefore, it must be true almost
beyond peradventure that any chattel found in one of these private rooms,
access to which was had only by persons renting boxes, must have been
the property of one of the trust company's customers, and that any prop-
erty, whether left in the customer's box, or left m this private room, was
in a true sense in the custody of the trust company as the agent of its cus-
35.Cases in which the finder prevailed even though the goods were discovered in a private
place include: Groover v. Tippms, 51 GaApp. 47, 179 S.E. 634 (1935), Bowen v. Sullivan,
62 Ind. 281 (1878), Zornes v. Bowen, 223 Ia. 1141, 274 N.W 877 (1937), Weeks v. Hackett,
104 Me. 264, 71 Atl. 858 (1908), Robertson v. Ellis, 58 Or. 219, 114 Pac. 100 (1911), Danielson
v. Roberts, 44 Or. 108, 74 Pac. 913, 65 L.R.A. 526 (1904) and Durfee v. Jones, 11 R.I. 588
(1877).
36 Of course, as will be seen in the discussion of mislaid property, infra, the owner of the
locus in quo may have prior possession due to the intentional placement of the property on
his realty; here, however, he has possession even though the goods are lost rather than mislaid.
3 7 Loucks v. Gallogly, 23 N.Y.Supp. 126 (1892) (money found on bank table in public
part of bank given to finder), Toledo Trust Co. v. Simmons, 52 Ohio App. 373, 3 N.E.2d 661
(1935) (finder given money found on floor in bank), Hamaker v. Blanchard, 90 Pa. 377 (1879)
(money discovered in public parlor of hotel awarded to finder).
38205 Ky. 234, 265 S.W 612, 43 A.L.R. 28 (1924), 10 CoRN. L.Q. 255 (1925), 15 Ky.L.J.
225 (1927), 16 KY.L.J. 51 (1927).
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tomers, or that at least it occupied toward its customer some fiducial rela-
tionship which imposed upon it the duty of caring for his property, whether
the owner was known or unknown."3 9
In Toledo Trust Co v Simmons4 ° the rule of the Silcott case was re-
stricted to the private areas of the safety deposit vault. In that case the
finder was given a preference after discovering money in a lobby at the
entrance of the vault. The court said in essence that the fiduciary relation-
ship discussed in the Silcott case existed only when the place was something
other than public or semipublicY.
As stated above, there is a line of cases which finds a fiduciary relation-
ship existing between a hotel and its guests in finder situations.4 This re-
lationship exists only when the guest is in his room or in other private areas
of the hotel, and when he leaves chattels in public parts of the hotel, the
owner of the hotel does not acquire prior possession of the chattel based
upon a fiduciary relationship.
43
Jackson v Steinberg44 and Flax v Monticello Realty Co.' are recent
cases which lend much support to paragraph (3) of the outline. However,
in both of these cases there are additional factors upon which the court
relies in holding for the owner of the locus in quo. In the Jackson case there
were two additional factors favoring the hotel owner" The master-servant
relationship and the fact that the goods were quite clearly mislaid rather
than lost. The mislaid argument was very forceful in the Flax case, and it
would also have been possible to have used the master-servant argument
39 In Pyle v. Springfield Marine Bk., 330 Ill.App. 1, 70 N.E.2d 257 (1946), 17 UNIV. or
CmN. L. Rv. 83 (1948), currency was found on the floor of a safety deposit vault and the
court favored the bank on the fiduciary relationship theory See also Foster v. Fidelity Safe
Deposit Co., 162 Mo.App. 165, 145 S.W 139 (1912), aff'd, 264 Mo. 89, 174 S.W 376 (1915),
in which the money was found on a desk in the safety deposit department and, therefore, was
mislaid rather than lost; there was dictum in the case to the effect that there was a fiduciary
relationship between the probable loser and the company.
4052 Ohio App. 373, 3 N.E.2d 661 (1935), 10 CNm. L. Rv. 500 (1936), 22 CoRN. L.Q. 263
(1937).
4 1 Additional cases involving money found in banks include Kincaid v. Eaton, 93 Mass.
139 (1867), Heddie v. Bank of Hamilton, 17 B.C. 306 (1912) and Cohen v Manufacturers
Safe Deposit Co., 101 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1950).
42 Erickson v Sinykm, 223 Minn. 232, 26 N.W.2d 172, 170 A.L.R. 697 (1947), Jackson
v. Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376, 205 P.2d 562 (1948), Hamaker v Blanchard, 90 Pa.
377 (1879), Flax v. Monticello Realty Co., 185 Va. 474,39 S.E.2d 308 (1946).
43 In Hamaker v. Blanchard, 90 Pa. 377 (1879), money was found in the public parlor of
a hotel, and although the court recognized the fiduciary relationship that exists between a hotel
and its guests, the finder prevailed since the goods were found in a public part of the hotel
where the relationship did not exist.
44 186 Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376, 205 P.2d 562 (1948), 3 VAND. L. REv. 661, (1950).
45 185 Va. 474, 39 S.E.2d 308 (1946), 46 MIcH. L. Rav. 235 (1947), 4 WAsH. AND LEE L.
Rlv. 214 (1947).
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to favor the hotel owner. Notwithstanding the additional elements present
in these cases, the courts did, by their language, stress the fiduciary rela-
tionship existing between the hotel owner and his guests and the importance
of that relationship in the determination of the respective rights of the
finder and such owner.4
A third factual situation in -which a fiduciary relationship may exist
between the probable loser and the owner of the locus in quo is where prop-
erty is left in private homes. The possibility of such a relationship was
suggested by the court in Foster v. Fidelity Safe-Deposit Co.47 when the
court said by way of dictum: "The mind refuses consent to the proposition
that one may go into another's house, whether business or residence, and
take away anything he discovers there which does not belong to the owner.
If one visits an acquaintance socially at his home, and comes away leaving
some article on a table, he has left it in the possession of such acquaintance,
and it seems absurd to say that another visitor would have a right to take
the property from the house under the claim that he had found it."'
As a parting note in a consideration of paragraph (3) of the outline,
it nght be well to consider the exception continued in that paragraph. If
the evidence indicates that the goods have been abandoned, it would seem
advisable to favor the finder since the reason for permitting the owner of
the locus to prevail (viz. the more probable return to the loser) does not
exist. This, of course, would hold true regardless of whether or not the facts
indicate that a fiduciary relationship exists between the probable loser and
the owner of the locus. Direct authority for the exception can be found in
Erickson v. Sinykin"9 in which case the court held for a finder who discov-
ever goods in a hotel room on the theory that the goods were abandoned.
46 In Flax v. Monticello Realty Co., supra note 45, the court said: "In the adjudications
which we have found a very controlling circumstance as to the rightful authority and custody
of the article is the control over the locus in quo m which the thing is found. The locus in quo
here is, of course, a private room in the hotel of the defendant. This court said in the case of
Crosswhite v. Shelby Operating Corporation, 182 Va. 713, 30 S.E.2d 673, 674, 153 A.L.R. 573
(1942) "An innkeeper (as distinguished from a landlord) is in direct and continued control
of his guest rooms." The court continued by citing Silcott v. Louisville Trust Co., 205 Ky. 234,
265 S.W 612, 43 A.L.R. 28 (1924), in which a safety vault was the place of finding, as having
facts analogous to the leaving of chattels in a hotel room.
47 162 MoApp. 165, 145 S.W 139 (1912), afi'd, 264 Mo. 89, 174 S.W 376 (1915).
48 In In re Savarino, 1 Fed.Supp. 331 (1932), the court did not mention the possibility of
a fiduciary relationship between the owner of a cab and the cab's passengers. In that case money
was found on the floor of the cab and the court seemed to stress the public nature of the place
and the fact that the goods were probably lost rather than mislaid in holding for the finder.
49223 Minn. 232, 26 N.W.2d 172, 170 A.L.R. 697 (1947), 33 IowA L. Rav. 155 (1947),
46 McH. L.R av. 266 (1947), 32 MNrn. L. Rv. 192 (1948), 4 WAsir. AN LEE L. Rnv. 214 (1947).
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Lost vs. Mislaid
More litigation involving the respective rights of finders and the own-
ers of the locus in quo have been decided upon the distinction between lost
and tmslaid or misplaced property than upon all other grounds combined.
Goods are considered lost when from their nature, the place in which they
were found, and their condition upon finding, it is evident that they were
inadvertently and unintentionally dropped where found. Mislaid goods
are goods which have been intentionally placed where found. Although
there has been some criticism of the great importance placed upon this dis-
tinction due to the difficulty of determining whether lost or mislaid goods
are involved in a given case, the reason for the distinction appears to be
sound, and the determination of fact is not unreasonably speculative since
the law involved is well settled. The finders of fact should merely be in-
structed to determine whether the deposit of the chattel by its owner was
intentional or unintentional and to consider in their deliberation the size
and value of the chattel, the nature of the place where it was discovered,
and its condition upon discovery
The policy behind the rule is simply based upon the fact that in the
case of mislaid goods the mislayer will probably know where the goods are
and will return to the place where he misplaced them, while the owner of
goods which were lost rather than mislaid will probably be unaware of the
locus of the goods. Therefore, in order to insure the return of misplaced
goods the owner of the locus is deemed to possess them before the finder
reduces them to his physical possession, and is a gratuitous bailee for the
loser. In the case of lost goods, the desire to encourage finding, according
to the reasoning of the courts,"° outweighs all other considerations since the
loser's chances of recovering the lost goods will not be substantially affected
by the decision to permit the finder to retain the goods.5'
The rights of a finder in relation to goods which he discovered was first
recogmzed in the case of Armory v. Delamirie.52 In 1840 the Delaware
court in Clark v. Maloney' made the following statement: "It is for this
reason, that the finder of a chattel, though he does not acquire an absolute
property in it, yet has such a property, as will enable him to keep it against
all but the rightful owner."
54
50 It appears to be the concensus of opinion of writers on the subject that the owner of
the locus should be preferred in most, if not all, situations. See e.g., 22 CORN. L.Q. 263 (1937).
51 There is a duty on the part of the finder and the locus in quo, if they have the goods,
to make a reasonable effort to find the loser, and the failure to make such an effort might sub-
ject the possessor to criminal prosecution. See State v. Levy, 23 Minn. 104, 23 Am.Rep. 678
(1876), Burns v State, 145 Wis. 373, 128 N.W 987, 140 Am. St. Rep. 1081 (1910).
52 1 Strange 505, 93 Eng. Reprint 664 (172.2).
533 Har. 68 (1840)
54 It would have been a more accurate statement if the court would have added: "or persons
having prior possessory rights."
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After it was well settled that a finder could keep the discovered chattels
as against all claimants who are unable to show prior possessory rights, it
was held in Lawrence v. State55 and McAvoy v. Medina5" that the owner
of the locus in quo had prior possession of all goods intentionally placed
upon his property 57 Following these cases the American courts have, with
few exceptions,58 followed the distinction between lost and mislaid prop-
erty; and, with the exceptions mentioned in paragraphs (1) and (3) of the
outline, have favored the finder when the goods were considered lost,59 and,
55 1 Humph. (Tenn.) 228, 34 Am.Dec. 644 (1839).
56 11 Allen (Mass.) 548, 87 Am.Dec. 733 (1866).
57 See p. 181 supra for another instance in which the owner of the locus was considered
a prior possessor; viz. where a fiduciary relationship exists between the probable loser and such'
owner.
r At least four cases might be cited as being contra to the general authority. In Tatum
v. Sharpless, 6 Phila. 18 (1865) the court held for a finder when a pocket book was discovered
on the seat of a passenger car; the date of the case and the fact that it could be argued that
the pocket book was lost would indicate that the Tatum case is probably not contra to the
normal rule. In Batteiger v. Penn. Co., 64 Pa. Sup. 195 (1916) the facts were similar to the
Tatum case and the court found for the finder. In the Battezger case as well as in Hamaker v.
Blanchard, 90 Pa. 377 (1879), the Pennsylvania court recognized the lost vs. nislaid rule,
although its reasoning in the Batteiger case appears questionable. See 49 Dicx. L. REv. 124
(1945) for comments on the Pennsylvania cases.
The early case of Barker v. Bates, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 255 (1832) may also be cited as contra
to the general authority; however, the date of the case and the fact that the finder was a tres-
passer on the land when he found the goods (the affect of trespassing on the rights of the finder
is considered at p. 193 -nfra), matke the Barker case weak authority against the normal rule.
A fourth case which might be considered contra to the American rule is Ferguson v. Ray,
44 Or. 557, 77 Pac. 600 (1904), in which gold-bearing quartz was found on land. In that case
the court recognized the rights of finders to lost goods, but their reasoning in holding for the
owner of the locus in quo is not clear; they do not base their opinion upon the conclusion that
the goods were mislaid, although they said that they might have been mislaid. The Oregon
court on other occasions has followed the normal rule. In the Ferguson case the court relied to
a great extent upon South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, 2 Q.B.D. 44 (1896) which holds
that the owner of the locus always prevails, whether the goods were lost or mislaid, if the dis-
covered chattels are "attached to or under" the ground. There affinity for the Sharman case
mght indicate that the Ferguson decision could be cited as an exception to normal lost vs.
mislaid law. (See p. 194 infra for a discussion of the possibility of the gold bearing quartz
being considered part of the realty). Oregon cases are discussed in Notes, 48 Micu. L. REV. 352
(1950), 21 ORE.L.Rv. 85 (1941).
59 Bowen v. Sullivan, 62 Ind. 281 (i876) (money found in waste paper in paper mill),
Hoagland v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co., 170 Mo. 335, 70 S.W 878 (1902) (pocket
book found on the ground in an amusement park), Cleveland Ry. v. Durschuk, 31 Ohio App.
248, 166 N.E. 909 (1928) ($20 bill found on floor of street car), Hamaker v. Blanchard, 90 Pa.
377 (1879) (money found in public parlor of hotel), Durfee v. Jones, 11 R.I. 588 (1877)
(money found in a crack in a safe; the court held that the money was originally intentionally
placed in the safe, which would cause it to be treated as mislaid property, but was subsequently
lost when it slipped into the crack), Deaderick v. Oulds, 86 Tenn. 14, 5 S.W 487 (1887) (logs
found on land), In re Savorno, 1 Fed.Supp. 331 (1932) (money found on floor of a taxicab).
See also the cases cited um relation to the materials on the master-servant and fiduciary relation-
ships, supra, in which cases the right of the finder of lost property was recognized.
In several cases the courts have held that property was not "found" within the meaning
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with the exception mentioned in paragraph (2) of the outline, have favored
the owner of the locus in quo when the goods were deemed mislaid. °
As stated above, the English courts have given little or no attention to
the question of whether or not the goods were lost or Imslaid, and the Eng-
lish courts, for that reason, often reach a different result when considering
a given set of facts than have been reached by American courts on similar
facts.62
An Alternatve Outline
It may be argued that the outline set out at the beginmng of this article
is not all inclusive and does not recognize certain authority that must be
reflected in any statements purporting to state the entire law relating to
the respective rights of finders as against the owners of the locus where the
goods are found. In order to satisfy those who feel that the original state-
ment is incomplete, the following alternative outline is suggested.
(1) The owner of the locus in quo prevails if: (a) the finder was a servant
of such owner and had the duty to turn over found goods to him,
(b) The finder was a trespasser, or
(c) The found goods have become part of the realty.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the finder prevails if the goods
were abandoned or intentionally concealed.
of a reward statute if it was mislaid rather than lost; see e.g., Flood v City National Bank,
218 Iowa 898, 220 Iowa 935, 253 N.W 509 (1934), DeYoung v. Foster, 239 Iowa 762, 32 N.W.2d
664 (1948), Kincaid v Eaton, 98 Mass. 139 (1867) , Sovern v Yoran, 16 Or. 269, 20 Pac. 100
(1888), Zech v. Accola, 253 Wis. 80, 33 N.W.2d 232 (1948).
60 McAvoy v. Medina, II Allen (Mass.) 548 (1866) (pocket book found on a table m a
barber shop), State v Buzard, 235 Mo.App. 636, 144 S.W.2d 847 (1940) (valuables found m
box in wall, discovered by finder while wrecking building), Foster v. Fidelity Safe-Deposit
Co., 162 Mo.App. 165, 145 S.W 139 (1912), aff'd, 264 Mo. 89, 174 S.W 376 (1915) (money
found on desk in safety deposit department of a bank), Foulke v. New York Consolidated Ry
Co., 228 N.Y. 269, 127 N.E. 237 (1920) (package found on seat of passenger train), Loucks v.
Gallogly, 23 N.Y. Supp. 126 (1892) (money found on bank table), Jackson v. Steinberg, 186
Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376, 205 P.2d 562 (1948) (money found in bureau located in a hotel room),
Flax v. Monticello Realty Co., 185 Va. 474, 39 S.E.2d 308 (1946) (valuable brooch found by
maid in a mattress in a hotel room), Heddle v. Bank of Hamilton, 17 B.C. 306 (1912) (wallet
found on desk in bank). See also cases cited in the discussion of abandonment p. 182 supra,
in which cases the court recognized the owner of the locus in quo's right to mislaid goods.
61 Public v. private locus materials, p. 188 supra.
6 2 Hannah v Peel, (1945) K.B.D. 509 (brooch found in crevice of a window frame given
to finder; would appear to be mislaid goods), South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman,
2 Q.B.D. 44 (1896) (rings found in bottom of pool given to landowner; goods would appear
to be lost), Eldes v. Brigg Gas Co., 33 Chan. Div. 562 (1886) (boat found buried under land
given to landowner; court either goes on theory of private property or the theory that the
boat bad become part of the realty), Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 21 L.J.Q.B. 75 (1851) (notes
found on floor of shop given to finder; lost goods involved but court stressed the public nature
of the place of discovery)
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(3) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the owner of the locus in quo
prevails if such owner was in a fiduciary relationship with the probable
loser at the time the goods were lost or misplaced.
(4) Except as provided in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3), the finder prevails
if the goods were lost, and the owner of the locus in quo prevails if the
goods were mislaid.6
Subparagraph (b) of paragraph (1) of the alternative outline has been
accepted as good law ever since 1832 when the Massachusetts court in
Barker v. Bates"' ruled for the owner of the locus in quo as against the
finder when the latter was a trespasser. Three factors caused the omission
of subparagraph (b) of paragraph (1) of the alternative outline from the
original outline. In the first place there is little or no authority (outside
of the Barker case) in point which supports the rule of Barker v.-Bates,
while in Groover v. Tippins 5 the Georgia court indicated that the status
of the finder while on the land was immaterial in the consideration of his
rights to the lost property Secondly, in a subsequent Massachusetts case68
the court said that a person who went on the land to rescue property of an-
other was not a trespasser within the rule expounded in Barker v. Bates.
This factor, if accepted as good law, makes subparagraph (b) of paragraph
(1) of the alternative outline somewhat misleading. Thirdly, if it is accepted
that the encouragement of finding is the strongest public policy factor in
cases in which goods are lost, it would seem preferable to favor the finder
regardless of his status in relation to the land.67
The authority for the statement in subparagraph (c) of paragraph (1)
seems to be vested solely in the recent case of Allred v. Biegel.68 In this case,
which quite noticeably was the subject matter of much comment,69 the
Missouri court held that an Indian canoe uncovered by eroding water and
discovered by someone other than the owner of the land upon which it was
located, was part of the realty. The court cited as authority for its holding
Goddard v. Winchell,70 Ferguson v. Ray71 and Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co.72
It is questionable whether any of these cases support the proposition that
63 Except for the Latin phrases, italics denote an addition to the original outline.
6413 Pick. (Mass.) 285. The inclusion of the Barker case in casebooks has added to its
recognition as a case expounding good law.
65 51 Ga.App. 47, 179 S.E. 634 (1935).
6 Proctor v. Adams, 113 Mass. 376 (1873).
67 For instance, when a person discovers a ring lying on another's land while walking on
a sidewalk or across a vacant lot, the finder should probably prevail.
6s 240 Mo.App. 818, 219 S.W.2d 665 (1949), 4 Aux. L. Rev. 495 (1950), 2 BAviLoR L. REv.
110 (1949), 48 Mic. L. REv. 368 (1950), 3 OTA. L. REv. 454 (1950), 29 ORE. L. REv. 157
(1950).
69 See citations in note 68, supra.
70 86 Iowa 71, 52 N.W 1124 (1892).
7144 Or. 557, 77 Pac. 600 (1904).
7233 Chan. Div. 562 (1886).
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a chattel becomes part of the realty after being buried in land for a long
period of time.73 In the Goddard case74 the subject matter involved was an
aerolite which probably was never considered personal property, or at least
was never possessed by anyone before its discovery In Ferguson v Ray75
and Elwes v Brtgg Gas Co.,76 the court did not directly hinge its opinion
on the theory that the chattel involved had become part of the realty, but
relied more directly upon the fact that the place in which the chattel was
discovered was private,77 and the owner of the locus possessed the goods as
chattels and not as part of the land.78
In addition to the fact that subparagraph (c) of paragraph (1) of the
alternative outline is not well supported, the insertion of that subparagraph
into the original statement would add an ambiguous element to an outline
which is, in the opimon of the writer, quite free from ambiguity At least,
the law is fairly well settled regarding the standards and tests for deter-
mimng when property is lost, mislaid or abandoned, and when a fiduciary
relationship exists. But at what point does a chattel become realty? What
test is to be used? Certainly we cannot follow the law of fixtures here,
which makes such a rule, if followed, an exception to the normal law of
fixtures. Considering these factors it was deemed advisable to ormt the
proposition expounded in subparagraph (c) from the original outline.
The intentional concealment provision added to paragraph (2) of the
original outline has little or no support in the cases. It has been suggested
73 The court in the Allred case could possibly have used Burdick v. Chesebrough, 88 N.Y
Supp. 13 (1904), as authority for its position. In the Burdick case the court held that earthen-
ware which had been buried in the ground became part of the realty However, in the Burdick
case the contest was not between a finder and the owner of the locus zn quo; in addition, the
court relied heavily upon the Elwes case which is doubtful authority for such a conclusion.
7486 Iowa 71, 52 N.W 1124 (1892).
7544 Or. 557, 77 Pac. 600 (1904)
7633 Chan. Div. 562 (1886).
77 In the Elwes case (note 76 supra) Judge Chitty said "The first question which does
actually arise in this case is whether the boat belonged to the plaintiff at the time of the grant-
ing of the lease. I hold that it did, whether it ought to be regarded as a mineral, or as part of
the soil within the maxim above cited, or as a chattel. If it was a mineral or part of the soil in
the sense above indicated, then it clearly belonged to the owners of the inheritance as part of
the inheritance itself. But if it ought to be regarded as a chattel, I hold the property in the
chattel was vested in the plaintiff, for the following reasons. Being entitled to the inheritance
under the settlement of 1856 and in lawful possession, he was in possession of the ground, not
merely of the surface, but of everything that lay beneath the surface down to the centre of the
earth, and consequently in possession of the boat."
78The court in Ferguson v Ray, 44 Or. 557, 77 Pac. 600 (1904), concluded its opinion
with the following statement: "Being in possession of the land, and exercisng ownership over
it, thus manifesting an intention to prevent unauthorized interference, we must conclude, as
was announced by Lord Russell in South Staffordshire Waterworks v Sharman, supra, that
'the presumption is that the possession of the article found is in the owner of the locus in quo.' "
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as a good rule; 79 but when a finder is preferred in cases dealing with con-
cealed goods, the courts have always relied upon the abandonment features
in the cases" The theory behind giving a preference to finders in conceal-
ment situations is centered upon the idea that the owner of the locus in quo
would not acquire prior possession since the probable loser did not intend
for him to take custody of the goods. However, concealed goods are also
mislaid goods and the policy behind favoring the owner of the locus in quo
when chattels are mislaid would seem to apply with equal force to the situ-
ation where the property is concealed as well as mislaid.
Conclusion
As has been noted throughout this article, its purpose is to state what
the law relating to finders as against the owner of the locus is, in the ab-
sence of statute, and not what it should be. Probably the best solution to
the problem would be to permit the owner of the locus rn quo to hold the
property for a given period, at the end of which period the property would
be given to the finder."' The courts' failure to follow this formula is prob-
ably based upon their desire, as has been seen in real property litigations,
to settle the matter at once and not hold rights in abeyance.8 2
Although it is rather difficult to adequately support some of the propo-
sitions stated in the original outline, it is believed that they are all sup-
ported by good reason and will be followed by the courts in the future. The
master-servant and fiduciary relationship conclusions appear to be beyond
doubt, although the extent to which the latter may be carried is question-
able. There is little direct authority favoring the finder when the goods are
abandoned outside of the Oregon casesS3 and Erickson v. Sinykin; 4 how-
ever, there is much language even in cases holding for the owner of the
locus in qua which would indicate that the abandonment rule is sound.
7 9 
BROWi, PERSONAL PROPERTY, p.25.
80 See discussion on treasure trove, p. 182 supra. Notet in particular Erickson v. Sinykin,
223 Minn. 232, 26 N.W.2d 172, 170 A.L.R. 697 (1947), in which the court strained to find
abandonment while they could have favored the finder on the basis of concealment if they
recognized the concealment rule.
8 1 See Morton, Public Policy and the Finder Cases, 1 Wyo. L.J. 101 (1947).
82 For instance, in the dosing of classes the courts have refused to pay an aliquot share
of the gift to those persons who have complied with all conditions precedent until the class has
dosed; hence, in order to not unduly injure the persons entitled to part of the class gift by a
delay in payment, the courts have often closed the class prematurely. It would appear advis-
able, in such a situation, to permit those entitled to payment to take their share and to give a
bond in case more people come into the class; but the courts want to have the matter settled
ab initio, and hold to their policy of restricting payment until the class is dosed.
83 Robertson v. Ellis, 58 Or. 219, 114 Pac. 100 (1911), Danielson v. Roberts, 44 Or. 108,
74 Pac. 913, 65 L.R.A. 526 (1904). See Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376, 205 P.2d
562. But cf., Ferguson v. Ray, 44 Or. 557, 77 Pac. 600 (1904).
64 223 Minn. 232, 26 N.W.2d 172, 170 A.L.R. 697 (1947).
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In the making of any summary of the law a writer usually runs into
many controversial areas. These areas were noticebaly numerous in this
field. Five factors are not expressly included in the outline, and it may be
argued by many that they should have been included in some form or other.
It was considered advisable to omit treasure trove because of the confusion
surrounding its present status, and to have it treated as mislaid goods
which has, or has not, been abandoned. The public vs. private land distinc-
tion gave way to the consideration of the existence of a fiduciary relation-
ship, the latter appearing to be the factor upon which American courts rely
when the case turns on the nature of the place where the chattel was found.
The question of whether or not the finder as a trespasser was not reflected
in the outline because there is little authority to the effect that being a tres-
passer influence the rights of the finder. The theory that a chattel may
become part of the realty although it has never been the intent of any party
to have it become a fixture, has been rejected in the outline for two reasons:
the lack of authority supporting such a proposition and the ambiguity
which such a concept would create in any summary Finally, the conceal-
ment or lack of concealment of the goods was not considered in the outline
because of the absence of authority to sustain a distinction based upon
intentional concealment.
Although it is impossible to say unequivocally that the outline set out
in this article is an accurate statement of the law, it is believed that it does
give some order to the chaotic condition of one's mind after reading a
selected group of cases on the subject. It is for this purpose that this article
was written.
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